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 1 Introduction  
 Usage of automatic systems in airliners has increased fuel efficiency, added extra capabilities, 
enhanced safety and reliability, as well as provide improved passenger comfort since its introduction in 
the late 80’s.  However, original automation benefits, including reduced flight crew workload, human 
errors or training requirements, were not achieved as originally expected. Instead, automation introduced 
new failure modes, redistributed, and sometimes increased workload, brought in new cognitive and 
attention demands, and increased training requirements [1, 2, 3].  Modern airliners have numerous flight 
modes, providing more flexibility (and inherently more complexity) to the flight crew.  However, the 
price to pay for the increased flexibility is the need for increased mode awareness, as well as the need to 
supervise, understand, and predict automated system behavior [4].  Also, over-reliance on automation is 
linked to manual flight skill degradation and complacency in commercial pilots.  As a result, recent 
accidents involving human errors are often caused by the interactions between humans and the automated 
systems (e.g., the breakdown in man-machine coordination), deteriorated manual flying skills, and/or loss 
of situational awareness due to heavy dependence on automated systems [5, 6]. 
This paper describes the development of the increased complexity and reliance on automation baseline 
model, named FLAP for FLightdeck Automation Problems.  The model development process starts with a 
comprehensive literature review followed by the construction of a framework comprised of high-level 
causal factors leading to an automation-related flight anomaly.  The framework was then converted into a 
Bayesian Belief Network (BBN) using the Hugin Software v7.8 [7].  The effects of automation on flight 
crew are incorporated into the model, including flight skill degradation, increased cognitive demand and 
training requirements along with their interactions.  Besides flight crew deficiencies, automation system 
failures and anomalies of avionic systems are also incorporated.  The resultant model helps simulate the 
emergence of automation-related issues in today’s modern airliners from a top-down, generalized 
approach, which serves as a platform to evaluate NASA developed technologies.   
2 Background Information 
2.1 Objectives 
The modeling effort discussed in this paper is part of a series of models that serve the NASA Aviation 
Safety Program’s (AvSP) portfolio assessment by providing simulation capability for complex aviation 
accidents at the system level.  These models1 provide quantitative analysis capability, enabling the AvSP 
to assess the portfolio impact on the reduction of aviation system risk in current day operations.2  Besides 
models, the AvSP synthesizes results of systems analyses, assessments, and studies for programmatic 
decision making and research portfolio prioritization and communication [9]. 
The focus of the FLAP model is on the effects of increased complexity and reliance on automation 
systems in transport category aircraft accidents and incidents.  Consequently, the model aims to simulate 
contributors associated with man-machine interface breakdown, flight crew manual flight skill 
degradation, automation interface, overconfidence/complacency and simulator training, as well as 
automated aircraft systems failure and design.  Given that the modeling requirements of the current effort 
are identical to those of the Loss of Control Accident Framework (LOCAF) model, captured in detail in 
Shih et al. [9], employing Bayesian Networks was deemed the most appropriate approach. 
                                                     
 
1 The first model consists of aviation accidents caused by in-flight loss of control, captured in a model named 
LOCAF [8]. 
2 Future versions of these models will provide operations in NextGen environment. 
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 3 Literature Review 
A literature review on issues associated with increased automation and its effects on flight crew was 
conducted. The available literature mostly consisted of anecdotal work; describing main problem areas 
associated with increased automation usage.  One of the most cited works, the Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA) Human Factors Team Report [10] addresses flight crew/flightdeck automation 
interfaces in commercial aircraft, and provides comprehensive information on the issues and 
recommendations.3  Studies conducted by Billings [3], Sarter et al. [4], and Orlady et al. [11] also shed 
light on earlier issues encountered in automated systems as well as evolution of aircraft automation, 
which assisted in identifying primary issues simulated in this model. 
The Commercial Aviation Safety Team (CAST) [12] analyzed 50 Part 121 incidents over the past 5 
years involving energy state management and mode awareness.  The study identified two root causes – 
“(1) inadequate training and system knowledge, and (2) unexpected incompatibility of the automation 
system with the flight regime confronting pilots in their normal duties” [12, p. 3].  In another 
observational study, the Flightdeck Automation Issues project conducted by Research Integrations, Inc. 
compiled 94 causes obtained from previous work, accidents and incidents, surveys, and experiments [13].  
Another type of automation research involves pilot surveys. Survey-based studies collect information on 
pilots’ attitudes about flightdeck automation and automation usage acceptance in commercial operations 
[14, 15].  Surveys provide valuable end-user application data and feedback to manufacturers in enhancing 
guidelines for the design and use of future automated flightdecks [14].  
On a parallel effort, studies related to automation modeling were reviewed in order to help determine 
the approach followed within this study.  The reviewed studies were mostly aimed at demonstrating 
specific automation systems and/or their components, man-machine interfaces, and human performance 
using both human-in-the-loop and human-out-of-the-loop modeling.  Studies reviewed for modeling and 
simulation included – flight crew performance (involving attention, situational awareness, human 
cognition, multitask behavior, probability of failure to-complete, time-to master list items, proficiency, 
repetitions, etc.), automation system behavior, performed task, man-machine communication/interaction, 
and physical cockpit environment [16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22].  However, these studies mostly model a 
specific/unique system or subsystem actively present in the cockpit or the aircraft (similar to case studies).  
4 Data Review 
In accidents involving late model airliners, the essence of pilot error accidents is no longer related to 
“stick and rudder” or manual flying skills, rather, it is the efficiency of (system) monitoring of highly 
automated aircraft [3, 4, 23, p. 1].  Consequently, pilot error usually results in misalignment of 
automation system/modes, pilots’ perceptions and actions, and aircraft state.  Currently, common 
taxonomies and definitions for accident and incident4 reporting systems such as the CAST/ICAO 
Common Taxonomy Team’s (CICTT) Aviation Occurrence Categories or the accident types in National 
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) categories don’t have a dedicated group concerned with 
                                                     
 
3 The Flightdeck Automation Working Group (FDAWG) [5] recently released an updated version of the 1996 
report and findings that were compared against the FLAP model. 
4 NTSB defines an accident as an occurrence associated with the operation of an aircraft, which takes place 
between the time any person boards the aircraft with the intention of flight and all such persons have disembarked, 
and in which any person suffers death or serious injury, or in which the aircraft receives substantial damage and, an 
incident as an occurrence other than accident, associated with the operation of an aircraft, which affects or could 
affect the safety of operations [24]. The words “event” and “mishap” are used to describe the collection of accidents 
and incidents throughout the text. 
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 autonomy/automation-related issues.5  Lack of a dedicated category prevents a comprehensive search of 
the dataset of such accidents, which, in turn, limits the scope of statistical analysis capability on 
automation-related accidents with respect to all accidents within a certain database/timeframe.  The 
available data on automation-related accidents and incidents are not comprehensive or uniformly detailed.  
The Aviation Safety Reporting System’s (ASRS) incident reporting is voluntary, and automation studies 
“cherry-pick” certain well-known automation-related accidents, which prohibit performing a 
statistical/correlation analysis over the findings.  
The accident/incident data used to help the framework development include 50 mode awareness and 
energy management related incidents investigated within the CAST study [12], 46 automation-related 
worldwide accidents and major incidents investigated by the FAA [5], and 63 other accidents and 
incidents reviewed in other references and internet queries [3, 8, 14].  Given that these accidents and 
incidents are comprised of events in a large timeframe (1983–2009) and include multiple aircraft make 
and models with varying levels of automation along with the aforementioned shortcomings, this dataset 
was strictly used to identify key automation issues and causal factors and to help the SME elicitation 
process by providing case studies to illustrate node relationships. 
5 Overview of the Modeling Steps  
The FLAP modeling effort was comprised of two distinct phases.  First, a generalized automation-
related accident framework was developed, followed by the conversion of the framework to a Bayesian 
network model.  The framework development is provided in Section 6, whereas the details of the FLAP 
model are given in Section 7. 
The framework development is initiated with the literature and data reviews given in the previous 
sections. Following the reviews, a comprehensive list of causal factors contributing to automation 
problems was acquired and categorized based on responsible parties (e.g., flight crew, regulatory body, 
etc.).  These causal factor categories were then organized within a hierarchical manner; similar to 
Reason’s Swiss cheese model [25] used in the Human Factors Analysis and Classification System 
(HFACS) [26] and the previous modeling effort, LOCAF [8].  However, unlike HFACS, which only 
focuses on human failure/breakdown, this approach also takes automation system failures, as well as the 
flight crew-automation coordination breakdown into consideration.  The causal factors (or nodes) and the 
connecting links within the framework are supported and documented by both past studies and 
accidents/incidents alike.  The resultant framework is a generalized representation of automation-related 
accidents/incidents, capable of showing multi-dependencies among various automation stakeholders.  
The next step involved the conversion of the framework into a quantitative model using a Bayesian 
approach via Hugin Software.  The draft model was reviewed by Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) in order 
to obtain feedback, validation, and probabilistic data.  Following subsequent calibration, the resultant 
model, called baseline model, is capable of providing preliminary causal factors and their probability 
values leading to an automation accident and/or incident.  Finally, the model will be reviewed by internal 
and external panels before the AvSP products are inserted for portfolio assessment purposes.  The model 
will then provide the effect of portfolio elements (also called products) in reducing automation-related 
events in today’s aircraft operations.  The next section discusses the framework, followed by the model 
development and node descriptions, AvSP product insertion, and data collection and results. 
                                                     
 
5 ASRS incident database includes “human-machine interface” under human factors tab as a direct automation-
related factor since June 2009.  
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 6 FLAP Framework Development 
The FLAP framework is structured to contain both latent and active factors, similar to HFACS 
architecture used in the LOCAF model or Reason’s Swiss cheese model of accident causation.  Latent 
levels are considered as the supporting components for the active levels.  Active failure levels are the 
“pointy/sharp end” of the spear where the event takes place on the front line operator level, and are often 
directly linked to the accident or incident. Deficiencies or failures on each level are viewed as “holes.”  
Undesirable events are caused by overlapping of these failures/breakdowns (holes) at latent and active 
layers [26].  The FLAP framework containing three latent and two active levels and their interactions are 
given in Fig. 1. 
 
Fig. 1. FLAP framework overview. 
 
The first latent level (L1) includes the major stakeholders within commercial airline operations; i.e., 
regulatory body (FAA, Directorate General for Civil Aviation, etc.), aircraft manufacturers, and operators.  
Second level latent (L2) factors include issues related to high-level underlying factors, including 
automation characteristics such as design, interface, and reliability, as well as airline policy/procedures 
and training practices.  The third level consists of latent flight crew (FC) related factors such as 
complacency/trust, understanding and system knowledge, flight skills degradation, and 
experience/background.  
There are two active causal factor levels in the framework.  The first level active causal factors, (also 
considered as “triggers” or precursors), are divided into two sub-sections, Active A1A and Active A1B.  
These active failures take place during flight and stem from either automation system anomalies (A1A) or 
the underperforming flight crew (A1B) due to several reasons.  The active causal factors directly affecting 
the outcome of the accident/incident are given in the Active 2 (A2) level.  The underlying causes in A2 
can stem from A1A, A1B, and/or L3 levels.  For instance, the Automation Surprise node (A2 level) can 
4
 be caused by automation triggers (A1A), latent flight crew factors (L3) or precursors affecting flight crew 
performance (A1B).  The A2 level includes flight crew deficiency in system awareness, decision 
deficiency, and automation surprise, which can result in the flight anomaly and recovery.  In addition to 
the links present in Fig.1, factors in active and latent layers may influence each other. 
7 FLAP Model Overview 
The framework presented in the previous section was used as the basis of the Bayesian Belief model 
using Hugin Expert software.  In order to facilitate its representation and discussion, the model was 
divided into three sections using Hugin’s object-oriented feature, which allows encapsulation of certain 
parts of the model.  The FLAP model consists of the Top-Level in Fig. 2, as well as the encapsulated 
Automation and Flight Crew Conditions sections (called subnets) given in Fig.3 and Fig 4, respectively.  
This section provides the modeling method with the brief overview of the BBNs followed by the node 
definitions of all the encapsulated subnets. 
7.1 Modeling Method Overview 
7.1.1 BBNs 
A Bayesian belief approach was used to model the complex flightdeck man-machine environment.  
Today’s aircraft operate within a large, complex and safe air transportation system, where accidents rarely 
result from a single linear causal sequence.  Instead, accidents and incidents usually result from the 
deficiencies among the interactions between aircraft system, humans, and external environment variables.  
The linear causal or time order approach present in the event tree/fault tree methods are not suitable to 
model such multi-dependent causal factors, whereas a BBN is a more intuitive and appropriate method, 
easily capturing the multiple non-linear dependencies [27].  
A BBN is a directed acyclic graph representation of a network-based framework. BBNs contain a set 
of nodes that represent random variables and these nodes are connected via links designating the causal 
dependencies [28]. Within BBNs, random variables are represented via discrete (finite) or continuous 
(infinite) chance nodes.6  For the discrete chance nodes, the function describing the dependency of the 
node on its parent nodes is given with a conditional probability table (CPT).  Each node’s CPT includes 
all the possible combinations of its parent nodes. The probability calculation is done by using Bayes’ 
Theorem and the conditional probabilities obtained from the SMEs.  In the BBN framework, probabilistic 
and causal relationships among variables are flexibly represented and executed as graphs, and can thus be 
visualized and easily modified.  This facilitates model building and rapid interactive manipulations of the 
model to explore the causal features, which are particularly helpful when interacting with SMEs in the 
probability elicitation process [27]. 
 
7.2 Software Selection 
A variety of commercially available BBN software packages are available in the market.  An extensive 
review of this list of options revealed that the Hugin Expert v7.8, a commercial off-the-shelf software 
marketed as a decision support tool was found to be most compatible with the intended goal of evaluating 
various safety technologies [9]. The Hugin software is ideal for this task because it features a node 
category named “decision node,” which represents a decision to be made by the user/modeler.  Decision 
nodes are used to enable/disable certain technologies in the AvSP portfolio in the FLAP model.  
                                                     
 
6 Only discrete (finite) chance nodes were used in the FLAP model. 
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 One of the most prominent features of the Hugin software is the ability to create object-oriented 
Bayesian networks (OOBNs).  The OOBNs include an instance of another network, also called a subnet.  
Instance nodes connect to other nodes using input and output modes, enabling a modular representation of 
the encapsulated network.  This modularity not only allows a simpler representation of complex models 
but also enables the reuse of various individual subnets from different models within a larger more 
complex construct [9, 27, 29]. Hugin’s object-oriented capability was used to represent the Automation 
and Flight Crew Conditions subnet, both linked to the Top-Level model.7 
 
7.3 Conditional Probability Tables and Data Collection 
The Hugin software uses CPTs to calculate downstream node probabilities.  In the FLAP model, each 
causal factor node has a CPT with either two or three states, representing the node’s outcome.  The 
conditional probability values are gathered during the SME meetings (Section 13-15).  In order to 
illustrate the data elicitation process, the CPT of the Top-Level Manufacturer Management node (with 
notional values) is shown in Table 1.  Since this node has two parent nodes, there are 22, or four 
combinations of outcomes with two states (i.e., adequate or inadequate manufacturer management), 
yielding to a CPT size of eight.8  The degree of beliefs of the SMEs is collected for each causal alternative 
where the sum of the two states adds up to 1.0.  The experts were asked questions to provide probabilities 
considering the state of parent nodes that make up the four unique combinations.  An example for such a 
query is constructed as “Considering that there is evidence to suggest that airline operator has inadequate 
management and regulatory body oversight is also inappropriate, how likely is that the supervision issues 
arise?” (i.e., the second column in Table 1).  Similarly, the query for the last column will be a negatively 
constructed question stating that there is no evidence to suggest that there are operator management and 
regulatory oversight issues, etc.  The alternating combination of the parent nodes’ states comprises the 
values between the far left and far right columns [27]. 
 
Table 1. Manufacturer Management CPT 
 
                                                     
 
7 Note that Hugin Software allows encapsulation only if subnets do not receive any inputs from top level nodes, 
a requirement of directed acyclic graph structure of OOBNs to prevent directed cycles.  In order to overcome this 
constraint and for the sake of discussion, the common causal factors nodes are duplicated in all three model 
sections/subnets.  Actual model calculations are performed on a “flat” model, without subnets. 
8 For nodes with three states, with two parent nodes, the CPT size will be 12. 
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 8 Top-Level FLAP Model 
The Top-Level model is used to integrate the subnets and convey the causal factors to the event of 
interest; i.e., probability of an automation-related accident and incident.  Similar to the structure shown in 
Fig. 1, the Top-Level model, shown in Fig. 2, includes several layers of latent and active factors and their 
interactions, described in detail in the sections below.  
8.1 L1 Level: Latent Organizational Factors 
The bottom three nodes include the L1 level organizational latent factors such as the Regulatory Body, 
Manufacturer, and Operators/Airlines.  These nodes and their respective links are duplicated in 
Automation and Flight Crew Conditions subnets, but are only described in this section.  The Regulatory 
Body node represents deficiencies within the regulatory process in both aircraft certification and flight 
standards of commercial transport operations.  Example entities for this node include the FAA, the French 
Directorate General (Direction Générale de l'Aviation Civile, DGAC) or the United Kingdom Civil 
Aviation Authority.  When evaluating flightdeck components or aircraft at large, issues like inappropriate 
representation of operational environment (e.g., workload, experience levels of typical line pilots, training 
of flight test pilot, etc.) or insufficient/deficient regulatory processes (e.g., slow, burdensome certification 
or reluctance to modify unnecessary requirements, etc.) are included in this node [5].  Due to heavy 
influence and oversight, which delineates a cause-effect relationship, the Regulatory Body node is linked 
to five other nodes – Manufacturer, Training, and Operators/Airlines (Fig. 2), Automation Design, 
Automation Interface (links shown in Fig. 3).  Consequently, deficiencies found in regulatory practices 
can result in inadequate automation characteristics or manufacturer/airline management deficiencies [10].  
The Regulatory Body node has two states – “adequate/inadequate oversight.” 
The Manufacturer node represents large aircraft manufacturers as well as automation system/avionic 
equipment manufacturing companies.  The node includes deficiencies in manufacturers’ organizational 
climate, resource management, regulation implementation, and supervisory/oversight, which could result 
in deficiencies in their final product (aircraft or automation systems) [8].  The node also covers 
deficiencies in automation design philosophy and approach [11, p. 233], level of automation – including 
over-automation [14, p. 3], economic benefit [30, p. 232], and standardization and cultural diversity [10, 
pp. 46–50, 13] that could eventually lead to human factors issues.  The Manufacturer node inherently 
influences characteristics of Automation Design, Automation Interface (links shown in Fig. 3), and also 
affects Training and Policy/Procedures nodes [10, pp. 48–56,81,95,105] (Fig. 2).  This node is a binary 
node with “adequate/inadequate manufacturer management” states.  
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Fig. 2. Top-level FLAP model. 
 
The Operators/Airlines node delineates the organizational aspects of corporate airlines as causal or 
contributing factors in automation accidents/incidents.  This node includes deficiencies in organizational 
climate, resource management, supervision, training philosophy, and operational practices (crew 
scheduling, operational tempo), etc. These organizational deficiencies can trickle down and materialize as 
Training [10, p. 105; 15, pp. 313, 324; 30, p. 240] or Policy/Procedure [10, p. 65] issues.  Also, lack of 
adequate supervision and management guidance can result in Adverse Physiological or Mental States in 
8
 flight crews, links shown in Fig. 4.  Finally, during the SME meeting, an additional link was added 
between the Operator/Airlines and Manufacturer nodes, representing unrealistic airline 
expectations/requirements imposed on the manufacturers, driven by economic motivation and operational 
efficiency.  The Operators/Airlines node states include “adequate/inadequate operator management.” 
 
8.2 L2 Level: Latent Underlying Factors 
The second latent layer includes underlying factors affecting both automation systems and airline 
operations. These factors are Policy/Procedures and Training in the Top-Level Flap model in Fig. 2, and 
Automation Design, Automation Interface, and Automation Reliability (given in the Automation subnet, 
Fig. 3).   
The Training node includes deficiencies associated with inadequate training due to cost cutting, 
scheduling conflicts, instructional errors or inappropriate planning resulting in the pilot not receiving the 
appropriate knowledge and skill set necessary to safely fly the aircraft [8].  Within the automation 
context, training issues are generally associated with limited resources and the common practice of “on-
the-job” training of the remainder of automation functions that were left out during initial training [4, 10, 
11].  This node is connected to several causal factors in the model.  Different components of training are 
represented via the node it is linked to.  For instance, Training to Flight Skills Degradation designates the 
basic flight (stick and rudder) component of training.  Similarly, Training is connected to 
Awareness/Monitoring/Scanning/Attentional (Awareness/Monitoring for short) and 
Understanding/System Knowledge nodes as shown in Fig. 2 and Crew Resource Management (CRM) 
node in Fig. 4, representing respective training constituents.  The binary states of this node are 
“adequate/inadequate training.” 
The Policy/Procedures node covers deficiencies associated with inappropriate flight crew guidance 
caused by issues stemming from Manufacturer and Operators/Airlines.  For instance, some examples of 
inadequately determined procedures are – operator procedures inconsistent with manufacturer 
recommendations and design philosophy (e.g., use of autobrakes or flight directors as designed), incorrect 
modification of procedures for economic or fuel saving reasons, or inappropriate level of 
proceduralization (too prescriptive or general) [5, pp. 53, 55, 10]. The Policy/Procedures node is 
connected to the Flight Skills Degradation and Trust/Reliance nodes to represent cases where operator 
guidance on automation usage level solely promotes automatic flight aircraft handling.  Similarly, 
inappropriate guidance on aircraft control could interfere with pilot understanding and system knowledge 
and affect training procedures.  The states of the Policy/Procedures node are “adequate/inadequate 
procedures.” 
8.3 L3 Level: Latent Flight Crew Factors 
The nodes Flight Crew Experience/Background, Trust/Reliance, Flight Skill Degradation, and 
Understanding/ System Knowledge, constitute the third level of latent causal factors. 
The FC Experience/Background node is a leaf node (i.e., not affected by the presence of other causal 
factors) and is used to distinguish flight crew personal factors involving varying levels of experience.  
Using her survey data, Rudisill [14] highlights the differences between young, inexperienced and 
experienced pilots.  Although younger pilots grasped automation fundamentals faster than their 
counterparts, their lack of experience caused them to be fixated on automation failures, causing loss of 
situational awareness and failure to monitor flight parameters like airspeed, altitude, navigation, etc.  
However, with extensive automation usage, experienced pilots may demonstrate degraded flight skills as 
well as over-reliance on automation since opportunities to practice manual skills are scarce.  This node 
also includes differences of commercial pilots’ training backgrounds (military vs. civil aviation).  Pilots 
with a military background transition to civil aviation with higher average flight time and exposure to a 
wider flight envelope than civil counterparts.  In contrast, civil aviation collegiate level programs offer 
comprehensive highly structured programs with advanced flightdeck technology [5].  The two states of 
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 this node are “high/low exposure,” aimed at capturing pilots with various experience levels as well as 
backgrounds.  The high exposure pilot is assumed to have received structured training, experienced with 
broader spectrum of flight attitudes and/or accrued high flight hours.  The pilots with low exposure might 
possess low flight hours or high but routine operations mostly accrued in commercial operations with 
limited stick and rudder control and extensive automation emphasis.  The FC Experience/Background 
node is linked to the Flight Skills Degradation, Understanding/System Knowledge, and Trust/Reliance 
nodes [4, 30]. 
The Trust/Reliance node includes FC complacency and inappropriate confidence level assigned to 
autoflight systems.  Complacency is defined as the false sense of security as operators of a system come 
to rely on automation, generally carrying an unrealistic confidence in their personal efficacy [4, 15].  
Accident and incident investigations point to pilot over-reliance on automation as contributor roughly in 
one out of four events where pilots wrongly believed they understand all aspects of the system [5].  The 
Trust/Reliance node is a parent for three causal factor nodes; namely, Awareness/Monitoring [4], Flight 
Skills Degradation [31], and Decision Deficiency [30].  The causal relationships between the 
Trust/Reliance node and the Awareness/Monitoring as well as the Decision Deficiency nodes are 
illustrated in FAA study on flight path management systems as “automation reliance reduces system 
awareness of the present and projected state of the aircraft and its environment, resulting in incorrect 
decisions and actions [5, pp. 36–37].”  Similarly, as the FC relies more on the automation system, it is 
less likely that they will check on system and aircraft status or that they will intervene should any 
unexpected/undesirable behavior arise. Increased automation reliability, which possibly leads to 
complacency, was also linked to deterioration of basic position awareness skills [10, p. 43].  Additionally, 
pilots’ lack of confidence in their own skills on manual handling was also cited as the underlying reason 
for automation overreliance (linking FC Experience/Background to Trust/Reliance).  The states of this 
node are threefold – “overconfidence, under-confidence, and adequate trust,” which are mutually 
exclusive. 
The Flight Skills Degradation node contains the erosion of manual flight skills (e.g., basic stick-and-
rudder capabilities, flight control errors, instrument scan, etc.) due to continuous operation of autoflight 
systems and lack of practice, especially in FAR Parts 121 and 135.  As a result of the transition from 
classic flight instruments and ground-based navigation to modern flightdecks, manual, visual or non-
precision approaches are no longer employed, except when more advanced approaches (e.g., Global 
Positioning System/Required Navigation Performance or GPS/RNP with vertical guidance) are not 
available.  Mainly due to lack of practice (but also due to lack of motivation and scheduling), an increase 
in manual handling errors was identified in a recent accident/incident analysis and was associated with 
continuous operation of autoflight systems [6, 11].  Examples of manual flight operation vulnerabilities 
include: 
 Failure to “prevent, recognize and recover from upset conditions, stalls or unusual attitudes 
 Inappropriate manual handling after transition from automated control 
 Inadequate energy management 
 Inappropriate control inputs for the situation [5, p. 31].” 
 
Besides manual skills, the definition of this node expands to include decision errors associated with 
appropriate level of automation use and mixed-mode flying as well as usage of work-arounds 
implemented by the FC to address workload or inadequate procedures.  Since the Flight Skills 
Degradation node receives input from the Dynamic FC Conditions node, it represents the pilots’ current 
status including physiological, mental factors and distractions besides latent factors like Trust/Reliance, 
Training, and Policy/Procedures.  The Flight Skills Degradation node is connected to both the Flight 
Anomaly and Final Recovery nodes to represent the cases where degraded skills can cause flight 
anomalies or unsuccessful flight recovery, where automation support is not employed for various reasons 
(e.g., late runway change, Flight Management System (FMS) reprogramming restriction below 10,000 ft. 
or when the automation system is not reliable or available).  The states for this node are “degraded/not 
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 degraded flight skills.” 
The Understanding/System Knowledge node refers to issues related to flight crew knowledge of 
aircraft systems or presence of gaps and misconceptions in their mental model of the system.  Over the 
years, the proliferation of new flightdeck technologies substantially increased flight crew knowledge 
requirements.  Consequently, over 40 percent of accidents and 30 percent of major incidents identified by 
a FAA study showed knowledge deficit [5]. Deficiencies considered in this node include understanding of 
autoflight modes, autopilot, autothrottle/autothrust, and flight management computer and their complex 
interactions, system couplings, operating procedures as well as diagnosing and debugging automation 
problems.  Besides the flightdeck components, pilots’ insufficient information on operating limits and 
aerodynamic capabilities of the aircraft also is included in this node.  The Understanding/System 
Knowledge node is connected to the Decision Deficiency node since issues with pilot understanding are 
one of the primary sources of errors captured in the this node.  Pilot understanding is also linked to the 
Automation Surprise and Awareness/Monitoring nodes.  Lack of overall system understanding and 
knowledge can possibly prevent effective pilot mitigations to such hazards in cases where automation 
behavior is not well understood (e.g., automation surprises).  Similarly, system awareness is lacking due 
to inadequate knowledge of that system (i.e., knowing where to look) [1, 10].  The states for this node are 
“adequate/inadequate system knowledge.” 
8.4 A2 Level: Active Factors/Mishap 
The A2 or active failure level includes nodes associated with FC Awareness/Monitoring, Decision 
Deficiency, Automation Surprise, which lead to Flight Anomaly and Final Recovery.  
The first node in the A2 level is the Awareness/Monitoring causal factor.  Situational awareness was 
determined as a factor in over 50 percent of the accidents reviewed by FAA [5].  Situational (or system) 
awareness is defined as the “perception of the elements in the environment within a volume of time and 
space, the comprehension of their meaning and the projection of their status in the near future [32, p. 5].”  
In the aviation environment, the definition translates as the ability of a FC to track and anticipate the 
behavior of a) the automation system variables and controls, b) the aircraft state and flight parameters 
(position, speed, flight path, energy state), and c) the operating environment (terrain, air traffic clearances, 
and traffic) [4, 10, p. 43].  Besides deficiencies in situational awareness, this node also encapsulates issues 
related to attentional deficiencies such as inadequate instrument scanning and inadvertent flight crew 
activation of aircraft controls, which potentially result in automation surprises.  Several factors contribute 
to insufficient system awareness, including the automation interface (e.g., failure to notify indirect mode 
changes), training (e.g., insufficient methods/policies for monitoring mode changes), 
understanding/system knowledge (proliferation in the number of modes), flight crew complacency, 
workload status and flight crew conditions (presence of distractions and/or physiological mental states).  
Illustrating the issue, Parasuraman states that “gaps and misconceptions in an operator’s mental model of 
a system as well as inadequate system feedback design can result in breakdowns in attention allocation 
which, in turn, can contribute to a loss of situation, or more specifically, system and mode awareness” 
[30].  The Awareness/Monitoring node is linked to two nodes – Decision Deficiency [10, p. 35, 30] and 
Automation Surprises [4, p. 6].  Node states are “inadequate/adequate system awareness.” 
The Decision Deficiency node includes all cognitive errors made by the flight crew.  Examples of such 
errors include mode selection error (appropriate use of vertical speed mode, programming for a vertical 
navigation (VNAV) descent, etc.), mode confusion error (caused by indirect mode changes due to 
decreased awareness), flight programming error  (lateral route, vertical restrictions), FMS error (using 
FMS for runway change, programming for FMS departure/arrival), checklist use/procedures errors 
(checklist workarounds/omissions, continue landing with unstabilized approach, failure to go-around, 
etc.), misdiagnosis of faults, following inappropriate automation generated directive, etc.  These cognitive 
errors can stem from both flightdeck systems and pilot related issues alike. The Decision Deficiency node 
influences three nodes; Automation Surprise (via improper programming or mode errors), Flight 
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 Anomaly, and Final Recovery (deficiencies in recognizing the anomaly and selecting proper mitigation 
strategy).  The two states for this node are “decision deficiency/no decision deficiency.” 
The Automation Surprise term is coined by Sarter et al. [2], where the operator is surprised by the 
automation systems, unable to comprehend its current behavior or estimate future occurrences.  Pilot 
survey studies identified the phenomenon via pilots asking questions like “what is it doing now, why did 
it do that, or what is it going to do next? [14]” Automation Surprises surface as the result of inadvertent 
pilot activation, unannounced/indirect changes in modes and subsequent aircraft behavior, or as 
decompensation incidents where the automation disconnects and transfers the control back to the flight 
crew due to exceedance of control limits.  In cases where the flight crew’s situational awareness is less 
than adequate, decompensation can lead to an automation surprise.  The presence of automation surprises 
is one of the prominent causal factors for the Flight Anomaly node where the flightcrew recognizes that 
the aircraft is outside its flight envelope or restrictions via cues from aircraft systems (stick-shaker/pusher, 
bank limiter, configuration alerts, etc.) or air traffic control (ATC) interventions.  The node states are 
“surprise/no surprise.” 
The Flight Anomaly node designates any departure from the intended flight plan or safe flight 
envelope that qualifies as an incident, caused by flight crew decision deficiency, flight skill degradation, 
and/or presence of automation surprises.  The anomalies include aerospace deviation in altitude, speed, 
position, aircraft performance parameters as well as energy management deficiency, and aircraft entering 
a flight state without being properly configured.  Depending on the anomaly, the aircraft could potentially 
experience stall, LOC, over-speed, loss of separation (and consequent near mid-air collision, mid-air 
collision), controlled flight into terrain, hard landing, or other accidents/incidents (crew/passenger injuries 
and/or damage to the aircraft).  The node contains two states – automation-related “anomaly/no anomaly.” 
The Final Recovery node refers to the ability of the flight crew to recover from an abnormal flight 
condition defined in the Flight Anomaly node.  Given that the model simulates an accident/incident 
environment, the Final Recovery node plays a decisive role in whether the incident turns into an accident.  
Factors affecting flight crew’s ability to recovery are a) cognitive ability to recognize and determine the 
correct mitigation action (represented via Decision Deficiency node) and b) Flight Skills Degradation to 
capture flight crew’s current physical and mental attitude as well as experience and communication 
(CRM) abilities, which are necessary to implement the necessary mitigation action.  The Final Recovery 
node contains two states – “successful/not successful recovery.”  Both Flight Anomaly and the Flight 
Recovery nodes are connected to FLAP model output nodes, covered in Section 7-11. 
9  Automation Subnet 
As previously discussed, issues stemming from automation systems are compiled under the 
Automation subnet given in Fig. 3.  The subnet includes two levels of latent factors and one active factor 
level, and provides three outputs nodes to the Top-Level FLAP model. 
 
9.1 L1 Level: Latent Organizational Factors 
Similar to the Top-Level model, the Automation subnet also follows the active/latent causation 
structure where the major stakeholders (Regulatory Body, Operators/Airlines, and Manufacturers) are 
represented at the bottom, as latent causal factors.  The L1 level nodes are identical to those covered in 
the Top-Level FLAP model and are provided in Section 7-8-8.1. 
 
9.2 L2 Level: Latent Underlying Factors  
The underlying causal factor of the Automation subnet is the Automation Design node.  Due to its 
complexity, automation designers and programmers are unable to reveal all the possible flight regimes, 
failure modes, and scenarios during tests.  Issues like man-machine coordination breakdown often surface 
only after extensive operational experience mainly because system designers and developers are unaware 
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 of potential human factor problems [3, 11, 22].  For instance, Airbus A320/A330/A340’s feedback issues 
due to uncoupled sidestick design was highlighted by the FAA’s Human Factors Team in 1996 [10], yet 
13 years after, this issue was a factor in Air France Flight 447 accident.9  This node encompasses issues 
within the automation system design process including system, hardware, and software designs from 
preliminary phase to flight hardware including assumptions, requirements, testing/debugging, 
implementation, verification and validation, configuration management, quality assurance, etc. [33].  
More specifically, the Automation Design node includes deficiencies associated with:  
 
 system complexity where the details of the automation are difficult to understand and analyze in 
the event of a failure, due to tightly-coupled automation systems;  
 proliferation in the number of automation modes with many of them achieving similar goals, 
which increases the training burden and interface complexity leading to increased risk of flight 
crew error;  
 system coupling, referred to the internal relationships or interdependencies between or among 
automation functions, which are rarely documented, often leading to automation surprises;  
 designation of authority/autonomy; and  
 automation feedback design process including human-centered automation [3, 5, 10]. 
 
The Automation Design node is connected to all the downstream nodes in the Automation subnet since 
improper planning and execution of automation requirements can result in failures and unexpected 
behavior throughout the system.  The states for this node are “adequate/inadequate automation design.” 
                                                     
 
9 http://www.bea.aero/en/enquetes/flight.af.447/rapport.final.en.php   
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Fig. 3. Automation subnet. 
 
9.3 A1 Level: Active Factors/Automation Triggers  
The first active layer within the Automation subnet includes the Operating Environment node, the 
Hardware/Software Failure node, and five automation function nodes.  The Operating Environment node 
provides external causes that potentially affect the operation of Hardware/Software (HW/SW) either by 
disrupting sensor outputs (e.g., cold weather, ice, volcanic ash) or by damaging aircraft systems directly 
(e.g., lightning, impact damage).  Examples of mishaps involving cold weather include the Air France 
Flight 447 accident where ice crystal build-up on the pitot tubes resulted in the flight control system 
degrading to alternate law,9 or the ValuJet Flight 558 accident, where cold weather prevented proper 
extension of nosegear struts that actuate the mechanisms to shift aircraft systems to the flight mode.10  
The states of the Operating Environment node are “environment issue/no environment issue.” 
                                                     
 
10 http://www.ntsb.gov/doclib/reports/1996/AAR9607.pdf   
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 The HW/SW Failure node includes all glitches and malfunctions of the systems that were not 
anticipated by the designers, including malfunctions of antennas, sensors, or other measuring equipment 
that provide information to the automation systems downstream nodes.  Presences of failures, 
malfunctions, or glitches affect the respective automation functions downstream by definition.  The states 
of this node are “HW/SW failure/No HW/SW failure.” 
The Performance Systems function node includes issues associated with on-board performance 
computer (e.g., electronic flight bag system) function of the FMS, specifically, weight and balance, fuel 
weight, engine thrust limits, take off reference data (engine failure recognition speed – V1, rotation speed 
– VR, takeoff safety speed – V2, and runway length requirements), maximum/optimum altitude 
calculations, or carrying out the projected altitude or speed targets (climb power, maintaining speed, etc.).  
The node also includes the improper sensor inputs (due to design or hardware/software failure) used in 
calculation and measurement of the performance goals [34].  The two states for this (and the following 
automation function nodes) are “failed/not failed.” 
The Warning and Monitoring Systems include three types of automated warning systems; a) aircraft 
configuration for current or upcoming flight phase (landing gear warning if the gear is not down while 
throttles are closed or flap warnings if not set up properly before takeoff), b) monitoring of aircraft 
systems (including hydraulic, fuel, pressurization or other systems), and c) presence of environmental 
threats (ground proximity warning system, traffic collision avoidance system, windshear avoidance 
systems, ice protection systems, etc.)[11].  The Warning and Monitoring Systems function node covers 
the failure of these systems due to both faulty design and/or HW/SW failure.  Note that this node solely 
includes the design and implementation of the alarm system and assumptions whereas the issues related to 
ergonomic aspects of the warning systems (i.e., human perception and workload, de-cluttering, selection 
and characteristics of visual, auditory or tactile alerting systems) are included in the Automation Interface 
output node. 
The Navigation Systems function node includes components and systems used in navigation such as 
GPS, Very High Frequency omnidirectional radio range, distance measurement equipment, area 
navigation, vertical navigation, instrument landing system, and other precision approach system 
components.  This node also includes all the receivers used to capture frequency, range, bearing, localizer 
deviation, GPS position/ground speed, and time information [34]. 
The Flight Control Systems function node encompasses all the systems involved in automatic flight 
within the FMS and implementation of inputs via flight control surfaces.  This node includes failures 
associated with flight control surfaces (ailerons, rudder, elevator, flaps, slats, spoilers, trims, etc.), flight 
control commands (roll axis, pitch axis, thrust axis), and modes (automatic pilot, autothrottle/thrust).  This 
node also includes authority and autonomy related issues and assumptions such as envelope protection 
and stall/bank limiters.  Additionally, inertial reference data (providing position, velocities, vertical speed, 
pitch, roll, heading, acceleration) as well as air data (supplying altitude, speeds, and temperature) are 
encapsulated within the Flight Control Systems node [34].  
Finally, the Communication Systems function node includes data link (flight plans, clearance, weather, 
etc.) and surveillance systems (flight ID, aircraft state, trajectory conflicts, etc.).  Systems like the Aircraft 
Communications Addressing and Reporting System, telemetry, communication radios, satellite links, 
telemetry, and Automatic Dependent Surveillance – Broadcast/Contract (ADS-B/C) are included in this 
node [34]. 
 
9.4 Automation Subnet Output Nodes  
The Automation subnet provides three output nodes that are transferred to the Top-Level FLAP model 
– Automation Issue, Automation Reliability, and Automation Interface.  The first output node, Automation 
Issue, provides the probability of an automation system exhibiting malfunction or failure, stemming from 
any of the five functional systems described above.  Besides failures, inconsistent or unexpected 
automation system behavior itself can also be the root of flight crew confusion or decision deficiency and 
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 it is represented within the Automation Issue node. Unexpected automation behavior, which is captured in 
the Automation Issue node is also linked to Automation Surprise node [4].  The states of this node are 
“automation issue/no automation issue.”  
The Automation Reliability node is another direct output of the subnet, stemming from the Automation 
Design node.  Automation reliability primarily affects the flightcrew’s perception where highly reliable 
automation systems inherently increase reliance on automation.  However, deficiencies found during 
automation design processes could potentially result in higher number of failures, which, in turn, affect 
the perceived system reliability by pilots [10], therefore, connecting the Automation Reliability node to 
the Trust/Reliance node at the top level. The two states for this node are “reliable/unreliable automation.” 
The final output node of this subnet is Automation Interface.  This node is identified as one of the most 
prominent causes of man-machine breakdown due to its effects on flight crew situational awareness, pilot 
saturation and/or confusion [3, 4, 5, 10, 35].  As previously stated, this node contains the human-factor 
related aspects of the cockpit design.  In order to prevent pilot distraction and nuisance during critical 
operating regimes (takeoff and landing), manufacturers prioritize alerts and inhibit the transmission of 
lower importance/unrelated alerts at certain flight phases.  However, when performed improperly, the 
prioritization process has caused issues in the past [3, 35].11  Inappropriate determination of the 
characteristics of visual (location, size, brightness, color), auditory (sound level, loudness, frequency 
deafness, location), and tactile alerting systems (intensity, vibration, area of body) as well as alert 
categorization issues (human perception and workload, de-cluttering) are captured in this node [35]. This 
node also includes non-intuitive flight crew interface including inadequate feedback (visual, aural, tactile 
regarding aircraft status, mode selections,12 methods for annunciating of direct/indirect mode changes, 
etc.), and standardization (display symbology, nomenclature, and content on system synoptic and warning 
displays as well as differences in mode nomenclature and display among different aircraft types).13  The 
Automation Interface node is linked to three causal factors; Trust/Reliance, Awareness/Monitoring [4, 10, 
p. 43], and Understanding/System Knowledge [5, p. 78] as shown in Fig. 2.  The states for this node are 
“adequate/inadequate interface.” 
10  Flight Crew Conditions Subnet 
The Flight Crew (FC) Conditions subnet provides dynamic FC conditions to the Top-Level FLAP 
model, in an approach similar to Reason’s model of accident causation [25].  The subnet considers 
external and internal distraction sources as well as psychological and physiological aspects of FC 
performance.  As in the Automation subnet, the FC Conditions subnet includes active and latent layers, 
providing one output node to the Top-Level FLAP model (Fig. 4).  
                                                     
 
11 Decluttering/simplification of Primary Flight Display (PFD) on Airbus A330 was one of the causal factors in 
the accident during the test flight in Toulouse Blagnac Airport, France, since it decreased the system observability 
by hiding the active automation mode from the flightcrew [4].  
12 Different methods to identify the active mode such as pushed button illumination or mode annunciator 
indicator in PFD. 
13 Modes intended to accomplish a similar object might have different names and use different nomenclature for 
the flight crew interface.  For instance, in some aircraft, vertical navigation used within FMS is referred to as 
“VNAV,” while in others, these modes are called “PROF” for profile or managed navigation. 
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Fig. 4. Flight crew conditions subnet. 
 
10.1 L1 Level: Latent Organizational Factors 
Similar in structure to the Automation subnet, the FC Conditions subnet share the same three latent 
organizational factors; Regulatory Body, Operators/Airlines, and Manufacturers, which are placed at the 
bottom of the subnet.  These nodes are identical to those covered in at the Top-Level FLAP model and 
Automation subnet, and are provided in Section 7-8-8.1. 
 
10.2 L2 Level: Latent Underlying Factors 
The FC Conditions subnet contains two latent underlying factors; Policy/Procedures and Training.  
Both of these nodes are parent causal factors for the CRM node, which is considered as A1 level, both 
pre-flight and in-flight sections.  The Policy/Procedures and Training node descriptions are given in 
Section 7-8-8.2.  
 
10.3 A1 Level: Flight Crew Conditions Active Factors – Pre-Flight 
The group of causal factors in this layer helps determine the probability of FC readiness before the 
flight takes place.  The FC Preconditions node is an aggregation node that considers flight crew adverse 
physiological and mental states as well as pre-flight CRM deficiencies and determines how fit the crew is 
for the upcoming flight.  This node is linked to the Dynamic FC Conditions node, providing a baseline, 
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 which is then updated by considering the presence of distractions throughout the flight. The states of this 
node are “ready/not ready crew.” 
The Adverse Physiological States node includes physical fatigue (lack of sleep or demanding flying 
schedule), medical illness, excessive physical training, impaired physiological state, physiological 
incapacitation, self-medication, violation of crew rest requirement, and violation of bottle-to-throttle 
requirement [8].  The sole parent of this node is the Operators/Airlines node since inadequate supervision 
and operations within the company can result in insufficient crew rest period.  The node is connected to 
the FC Preconditions node, which then connects to Awareness/ Monitoring node, which is greatly 
affected by the presence of physiological issues.  The states of this node are “physiological issue/no 
physiological issue.” 
The Adverse Mental States node include complacency, distraction, get-home-itis, misplaced 
motivation, mental tiredness, distraction, confusion, depression, and/or alcoholism [8].  The presence of 
adverse mental states can be the cause of decision deficiencies (via the Dynamic FC Conditions node), 
which include omission errors.  The states of this node are “adverse mental states/no adverse mental 
states.” 
The Crew Resource Management (CRM) node includes deficiencies like communication skills and 
coordination that take place among the flightcrew as well as between other entities (i.e., other aircraft, 
ATC, maintenance facility and other support personnel) before, during, and after the flight [8].  The CRM 
node covers formalized confirmation and cross-verification of selected modes via verbalizing, verifying, 
monitoring as well as confirming, analyzing, monitoring and intervening.  Improper CRM (as erroneous 
communication between pilots) was one of the major contributors in around 40 percent of accidents 
identified by FAA study [5].  CRM deficiencies surface as cross-verification errors and crew coordination 
problems, including workload management.  The node is linked to both FC Preconditions and Dynamic 
FC Conditions, indicating issues associated with the pre-flight briefing as well as in-flight communication 
and coordination, respectively. The states for this node are “adequate/inadequate CRM.” 
 
10.4 A1 Level: Flight Crew Conditions Active Factors-In-Flight 
This part of the subnet provides the model with the updated FC conditions that are present during the 
flight. Along with the input from the FC Preconditions node and several sources of external distraction, 
the ability of the crew to perform flying duties is aggregated in the Dynamic FC Conditions node and 
outputted to the Top-Level model (node details are covered in Section 7-10-10.5).  Possible distractions 
the flight crew may encounter during a flight are divided into two categories – general distractions and 
aircraft system related distractions.  The in-flight component of the CRM node is also a causal factor in 
Dynamic FC Conditions, especially considering the crew’s ability to manage emergencies and 
distractions. 
The Aircraft (A/C) Systems Related Distractions node is an aggregation node that provides the 
probability of flight crew to get distracted by the presence of a) Automation Issues and b) SCF.  
Distractions stemmed from troubleshooting autoflight system anomalies/behavior as well as 
reprogramming the FMS are captured in this node. The SCF related node provides all other failures 
within the aircraft systems that are not associated with autoflight systems, such as the minimum 
equipment list.  Presence of aircraft system distractions inherently increases probability of flight crew 
experiencing fixation or saturation since they require identification and mitigation. The SCF node within 
this model, however, is not aimed to cover accidents/incidents where system component failures are 
determined as cause or contributors.  The node states are “presence/absence of A/C systems related 
distractions.” 
Another aggregation node, General Distractions, takes into consideration all other major sources of 
mental disturbance that potentially result in fixation or absorption.  The causal factors considered are 
fourfold; Traffic, ATC, On-board Personnel, and Weather.  The presence of traffic causing the crew to 
actively search for the surrounding aircraft was identified as a source of distraction in many mode 
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 awareness and energy management incidents [12].  Similarly, issues within the information flow to and 
from ATCs were identified in several references and accidents/incidents [12].  During the high workload 
phase of flight, frequent changes in the flight trajectory, where the pilots have to interpret, plan, and 
execute new clearances or issues with ATC communications, were deemed disruptive to crew situational 
awareness [2].  Besides ATC and traffic, numerous cases where cabin crew interference with cockpit 
(passenger emergencies/requests) or presence of the FAA Enroute to check the pilot during an initial 
operating experience flight were also identified as causes for the flight crew overlooking the autoflight 
systems [12].  One last causal factor for distraction was determined to be the presence of weather.  
“Adverse weather is a threat that is present in almost 60 percent of all flights” and it is managed by pilot 
mitigation [5, p. 30].  The presence of icing, fog/visibility issues, thunderstorms, rain, wind, and low 
ceiling are examples of adverse weather that cause additional mental work to the flight crew [12].  All 
four causal factors linked to the General Distractions node are comprised of two-state nodes (i.e., 
presence/absence of traffic, ATC, On-board personnel, and weather). 
 
10.5 Flight Crew Conditions Output Node 
As previously mentioned, the Dynamic Flight Crew Conditions node is the sole output of this subnet 
and it is linked to key causal factors including Decision Deficiency, Flight Skills Degradation, and 
Awareness/Monitoring. This node takes into consideration the presence of distractions (both aircraft 
related and other distraction sources) and crew related issues (CRM, as well as presence of on-board 
personnel, such as check airman or cabin crew) in order to calculate the probability of a crew member 
suffering fixation or absorption.  Fixation is described by “being locked into one task or one view of a 
situation even as evidence accumulates that […] the particular view is incorrect” [10, p. 59] or “failure to 
revise situation in presence of new conflicting information” [4, p. 5].  A fixated pilot may still believe that 
an unstabilized approach can be salvageable even when the rest of the crew, ATC, and aircraft 
instrumentation suggest otherwise.  On the other hand, absorption is a state of mind where the pilot is 
focused on one single task such as FMS programming or flight management computer troubleshooting 
while discarding others (also referred to as task shedding).  In the cases of inadequate CRM with poor 
workload management, presence of distractions could potentially lead to higher probability of fixation 
and absorption.  The Dynamic Flight Crew Conditions node is comprised of three mutually exclusive 
states; “fixation, absorption, and no effect.” 
11  FLAP Model Output Nodes and Preliminary Results 
As shown in Fig.2, the Top-Level model output nodes are Automation-Related Event Probability and 
Automation-Related Incident/Accident Probability.  Given the risk is defined as the product of likelihood 
of event and its severity, the model provides risks associated with heavy automation in today’s aircraft 
operations.  This is achieved by providing likelihood (probabilities) of such events occurring (via 
Automation-Related Event Probability node) and their severity (via Automation-Related Incident/Accident 
Probability node, which distinguishes between accidents and incidents). 
The model is designed to identify the prominence of automation-related issues among all foreseeable 
accidents and incidents.  For that reason, by definition, the Flight Anomaly node provides the probability 
of an in-flight upset resulting from the combination of the upstream automation-related nodes.  
Consequently, the Automation-Related Event Probability node reflects the ratio of automation-related 
events among all accidents and incidents. This node’s states are “automation anomaly/no automation 
anomaly.” The uncalibrated preliminary results of the FLAP model indicate that around 78 percent of all 
U.S. based accidents and incidents in today’s aircraft are related to pilot’s automation usage (probability 
of the “automation anomaly” state of the Automation-Related Event Probability node).  The remaining 22 
percent of these events are not tied to automation. 
The other output node, Automation-Related Incident/Accident Probability, is used to provide the 
accident/incident ratio using the Final Recovery node.  The Flight Anomaly node probability, combined 
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 with that of the Decision Deficiency and Flight Skills Degradation nodes, are the inputs to the Final 
Recovery node, which determines the probability of an incident evolving into an accident.  The 
assumption is such that recovered incidents remain as incidents (e.g., correction of over-speed or stall 
situation) where unsuccessful recovery efforts may result in injury to crew and passengers and/or damage 
to the aircraft, hence an accident. The states of the Automation-Related Incident/Accident Probability 
node are “accident/incident.”  The preliminary results indicate that around 2.7 percent of all incidents 
would result in an accident, and the remaining 97.3 percent of all automation events will remain as 
incidents. 
Besides the output nodes, all other causal factors nodes can be accessed individually.  The preliminary 
results show that around 80 percent of all events involve flight crew Decision Deficiencies, whereas 72 
percent of the cases were tied to failure in situational awareness (Awareness/Monitoring node).  The 
Flight Skills Degradation node played a role in around 70 percent of all the cases and the Automation 
Issue node, which includes malfunctions and unexpected automation behavior, was present in 50 percent 
of the cases.  It is important to note that these values do not represent the final values of the modeling 
effort, nor are they intended to be used in flightdeck automation, policy or decision-making processes.  
The next section provides an overview on how the model data is employed. 
 
12 AvSP Product Insertion Process 
NASA’s AvSP is responsible for developing methodologies and technologies (referred to as products) 
to improve air transportation safety within the NextGen environment.  The AvSP is comprised of three 
projects, namely, Vehicle Systems Safety Technologies project, System-Wide Safety and Assurance 
Technologies project, and Atmospheric Environment Safety Technologies project [36].  As previously 
discussed, the goal of the modeling effort is to gauge the impact of the products developed within these 
projects on current and future aviation risks.  In order to do so, the products will be inserted into the 
model by the SMEs and then verified by involved stakeholders to ensure proper placement.  The next step 
involves SME re-evaluation of affected nodes’ probability by considering the effect of the product.  
Owing to the Bayesian Belief structure, the benefits of the products are propagated downstream from the 
affected node.  For instance, a new methodology that potentially improves pilots’ situational awareness is 
applied at the Awareness/Monitoring node and can prevent a Flight Anomaly, hence lowering the 
automation-related accident/incident probability.  The AvSP portfolio analysis employs the relative 
impacts of various products to determine their individual and collective benefits.  The rectangular nodes, 
shown in Fig. 5, represent notional products and the arrows designate the affected nodes. 
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Fig. 5. Nominal product insertion. 
 
13 Data Collection Process 
 The data collection process for this model was similar to the previous modeling approach, LOCAF, as 
described by Luxhøj et al. [37].  In summary, the process consists of a series of SME elicitation panels for 
initial model development and probability data gathering, followed by internal and external reviews and 
conferences/publications to seek validation.  This section highlights the boundary conditions for the 
FLAP model, assumptions, elicitation process, and finally preliminary results. 
13.1  Boundary Conditions 
13.1.1 Model Perspective 
As previously stated, the model is intended to solely capture the probability of automation-related 
flight anomalies that could result in incidents and accidents.  The two Top-Level output nodes provide 
accident and incident probabilities of automation-related anomalies with respect to all conceivable 
accidents and incidents.  For that reason, the elicitation process strictly considers probabilities within the 
accident/incident perspective instead of all aviation operations when querying causal factor probabilities 
in the model.  This assumption renders the probabilities more tangible; e.g., probability of situational 
awareness deficiency with respect to all yearly U.S.-based flights (over 8 million departures in 201314 
alone) versus all accidents and incidents within the last 10 years (over 1200 accidents15 in Part 121 and 
135 and 35,000 incidents in ASRS database16).   
                                                     
 
14 http://www.transtats.bts.gov/ 
15 http://www.ntsb.gov/aviationquery/ 
16 http://akama.arc.nasa.gov/ASRSDBOnline/QueryWizard_Filter.aspx 
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13.1.2 Aircraft and Timeframe  
The model considers today’s aircraft operating within the United States, under FAR Part 121 & FAR 
135 with considerable but varying degrees of automation usage, such as Boeing B-737, B-747, B-757, B-
767, B-777, B-787 families and Airbus A300, A310, A320, A330, A340, A350 as well as regional jets 
like Embraer and Bombardier CRJs.  The timeframe for this study was a 10-year period including aircraft 
commissioned in year 2003 through 2013.  In order to determine and communicate the intended level of 
automation among experts, a taxonomy developed by Endsley & Kaber [38] was employed.  The 
taxonomy categorizes automation level one as fully manual, level ten as fully automatic control and the 
combinations falling between the two.  Although the aircraft cited above have varying automation levels 
for different tasks, an automation level-six, labeled as “Blended Decision Making,” was considered as the 
norm within the model and was communicated throughout the elicitation sessions. In a level-six 
automation aircraft, “[t]he computer generates a list of decision options that it selects from and carries out 
if the human consents.  The human may approve of the computer’s selected option or select one from 
among those generated by the computer or the operator.  The computer will then carry out selected 
option.  This level represents a higher level decision support system that is capable of selecting among 
alternatives as well as implementing second option [38, p. 465].” 
 
14  Assumptions and Limitations 
There were several assumptions made throughout the modeling effort due to limited resources.  As in 
the previous modeling effort and some other BBN approaches, the FLAP model embraces SME opinion 
for the sole source for data generation primarily due to lack of statistically meaningful data.  Although 
several accidents, incidents and studies were used to develop the model structure, the required probability 
values in the model were acquired from the SMEs.  Additionally, in order to keep the model size 
manageable and still achieve a generalized automation problem model, nodes like Awareness/Monitoring 
and Decision Deficiency17 contain several assumptions and error types, lowering the model resolution.  
However, since the model is primarily used to evaluate future NASA technologies’ impact as part of a 
system-level comprehensive portfolio analysis study, the model resolution and fidelity satisfy the analysis 
purpose.  Consequently, the model output is not intended to assist manufacturer flightdeck design or 
regulatory body (e.g., FAA) policy decision-making processes.  Also, due to the variance in application 
within the industry, the automation system was developed based on major functions instead of actual 
system components.  
15  Elicitation Process and Expert Profiles 
The probability data elicitation process consists of a series of SME sessions.  The model structure and 
probability values as well as the impacts of AvSP portfolio elements are acquired from the same set of 
SMEs, called operational SMEs.  For the FLAP model, the operational SMEs consist of two commercial 
pilots – experienced in Part 121 and 135 operations and airline management/training as well as one 
human factors expert specialized in flightdeck automation.  The additional SME panels held in-between 
operational SME meetings are used to ensure the model assumptions and structure are sound for the given 
study purpose.  A typical elicitation process for the modeling effort is highlighted in Luxhøj [37]. 
At the time of writing, the baseline model was established following the first operational SME 
meeting.  The goal of this four-day meeting was to review the preliminary model developed by the team, 
make revisions, and populate probabilities for the causal factors.  The baseline model is typically 
                                                     
 
17 The high probability value of these nodes can be attributed to the large number of deficiencies/errors 
considered in node assumptions. 
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reviewed by an external panel before proceeding with AvSP product insertions.  Depending on the 
application, the model with inserted products can also undergo an internal review by NASA technologists 
and other interested parties to ensure the products were placed appropriately.  During the second 
operational SME meeting, experts are expected to review the comments obtained by external and internal 
panels and also revisit the baseline model results to calibrate and ensure findings are matching experts’ 
mental models as well as limited historical accident/incident data.  
16 Conclusions and Next Steps  
This paper highlights the development process of a high-level automation-related accident/incident 
model aimed at serving as a platform for AvSP portfolio assessment.  In order to do so, past automation 
studies and accidents/incidents were reviewed and key issues were identified.  Similar to the LOCAF 
modeling effort, these key issues are then represented in a hierarchical manner and their 
interdependencies were mapped within the FLAP framework.  The network was then modeled using the 
Hugin Software.  In order to populate the model, SME opinions were employed due to lack of a 
comprehensive historical dataset.  
The next steps in the current modeling effort consist of an external review to check the baseline model 
soundness and validity, followed by the second operational SME session allocated for model calibration, 
review of concerns/comments provided by the external panel, and insertion of AvSP portfolio products 
into the model. Following a set of internal review meetings, the third operational SME meeting is planned 
to revisit the model and provide updated probabilities for inserted AvSP products and their impacts.  The 
analysis of the data stemming from the model provides insight on a) increased automation dependence on 
today’s aircraft and its implications and b) impact of NASA products in mitigating such issues.  Finally, 
the FLAP model will be integrated into the past and future modeling efforts owing to the OOBN 
modeling techniques, and will be further used in portfolio prioritization efforts.  
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